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Introduction 
Over a quarter of a century has passed since health care ethics committees 
(HCECs) in the United States received legal recognition as alternatives to 
the courts in resolving conflicts related to patient end-of-life care. By the 
mid to late 1980s HCECs had been established in over half of U.S. hospi-
tals and had received a certain legitimacy in the health care system. Given 
their age and growth one could characterize them developmentally as 
emerging from adolescence and establishing themselves in young adult-
hood. As a result, we might expect that they would have resolved the 
identity crisis characterizing the adolescent years. Yet, HCECs in the 
United States remain somewhat amorphous. In part, this may be due to 
their relative lack of legal status. In most U.S. jurisdictions HCECs remain 
unregulated and lack homogeneity in structure and operation. To the extent 
that they share common characteristics, these committees are multi-
disciplinary in membership and exist to address ethical dilemmas that occur 
within health care institutions. Early on in the evolution of HCECs, judges, 
in several judicial opinions, encouraged the development of these commit-
tees, and two states adopted statutes or regulations that provided them with 
legal status. Until recently, however, HCECs in most states have been able 
to develop in a variety of ways and perform a range of functions with lim-
ited legal authority or oversight. In the last few years, a handful of states 
have passed laws giving HCECs legal authority to make certain kinds of 
decisions. While these states remain in the minority, HCECs in most states 
serve a rple as a mechanism for "alternative" dispute resolution, particu-
larly in cases involving end-of-life care. This chapter reviews both the his-
tory of HCECs in the United States and their legal evolution. 
History of health care ethics committees in the United States 
HCECs in the United States emerged in response to advances in life-
sustaining medical technology and landmark legal cases concerning alloca-
tion and use of that technology. A forerunner to HECs (hospital ethics 
US. health care ethics committees 4 7 
committees) was the lay committee established in 1962 at Seattle's Swedish 
Hospital to decide how to allocate the use of the first community kidney 
dialysis units. At the time, they were the only dialysis machines available 
for outpatient treatment in the world. Other life-sustaining technology 
gaining widespread use in the 1960s and 1970s included cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR), long-term mechanical ventilation, and artificial nutri-
tion and hydration ("tube feeding"). Many of the legal cases concerning life 
and death medical decision making in the 1970s and 1980s involved dis-
continuing mechanical ventilation or artificial feeding. These cases influ-
enced the formation of HCECs as alternatives to courts in making such 
decisions. The opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the case of 
Karen Ann Quinlan was the first to mention the use of ethics committees. 
In Quinlan, Karen Ann's father asked to be given authority to terminate 
her ventilatory support as she had been in a permanent coma for several 
years. The Court recommended that each hospital in the state establish an 
ethics committee composed of physicians, social workers, attorneys, and 
theologians which would serve to "review the individual circumstances of 
ethical dilemma[s] and which [would provide] much in the way of assistance 
and safeguards for patients and their medical caretakers." 1 
Ethics committees were given further endorsement in 1983 when the 
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
wrote its seminal report on withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment. In the report, the Commission encouraged hospitals to "explore 
and evaluate various administrative arrangements" such as ethics commit-
tees "for review and consultation" of cases involving termination of life 
support for patients who lack decision making capacity in order to protect 
their interests "and to ensure their well-being and self-determination. "2 In 
addition, the Baby Doe Regulations, promulgated under the 1985 Amend-
ments to the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,3 recom-
mended establishment of Infant Care Review Committees in hospitals 
caring for newborns and use of the committees when considering with-
holding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from a newborn. 
Two states also required hospitals to establish HCECs. In 1987, the 
Maryland legislature enacted the Patient Care Advisory Committee Act 
requiring hospitals in the state to establish patient care advisory commit-
tees.4 The law was subsequently amended in 1990 to require that all nursing 
homes in the state establish or have access to such committees. Also, after 
the Quinlan case, the New Jersey Department of Health mandated that 
hospitals in that state establish either an ethics committee or prognosis 
committee as a condition of licensure. 5 
Perhaps the greatest motivation for hospitals to establish ethics commit-
tees was the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care 
Organizations' requirement in 1992 that, as a condition of accreditation, 
hospitals have in place a mechanism to resolve ethical dilemmas in patient 
care. 6 
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These recommendations and requirements significantly influenced U.S. 
hospitals to establish HCECs. The percentage of hospitals responding to 
surveys conducted by the American Hospital Association indicated an 
increase in the number of hospitals with ethics committees from twenty-
six percent in 1983 to sixty percent in 1985.7 By 1998, McGee and collea-
gues reported that over ninety percent of U.S. hospitals had ethics 
committees.s 
Membership of HCECs in U.S. hospitals 
Hospital ethics committees vary in size and membership. Studies indicate a 
range of three to thirty members, with the "typical" size between twelve and 
sixteen.9 Larger hospitals tend to have larger committees. 10 Virtually all 
HCECs include physicians, nurses, and social workers. Many include hos-
pital administrators or their designees, hospital board members, and 
clergy. 11 There are no definitive data on how many include community 
representatives, bioethicists, or attorneys. In a study of HCECs in Mary-
land, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, approximately half of the 
committees included a community representative but less than half had a 
lawyer or bioethicist. 12 
The prerequisite of multidisciplinary membership and deliberation calls 
for HCECs to include a variety of health care professionals as well as lay 
persons from the community and individuals knowledgeable in bioethics. 
Opinions about the ideal composition of ethics committees are influenced 
by attitudes about their process of deliberation. Those who view ethics 
committees as impartial panels that come to consensus on an issue, much 
like a jury, place importance on diversity of representation, including com-
munity members. Dugan writes, "[b]ecause [HCECs'] core interest is to 
promote patient care that reflects an interest in ethical values of patients, 
organizations, and healthcare professions, their expertise is the sort that 
calls more for breadth than depth of specialized knowledge." 13 Those who 
view ethics committees as providing an expert ethical opinion on a.n issue 
may place more emphasis on having members with bioethics expertise. 
However, definitions of "bioethics expertise" vary. 14 Ethics committees 
have been criticized for having an over-representation of institutional 
health care providers and under-representation of community members and 
members with bioethics expertise. Some critics have argued that committees 
engage in institutional protectionism and are biased in their membership, 
which is heavily dominated by health care practitioners. In an article in The 
Hastings Center Report, Cohen argued that "[t]he structure of some com-
mittees has been designed to protect institutional interests: a few are 
chaired by legal counsel for the institution; others are composed almost 
entirely of members of the board who 'have an interest in ethics."' 15 In 
addition, many members have no formal training in bioethics or law and 
simply sit on the committees out of an interest in the area. 16 Others have 
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also observed how an ethics committee's composition influences its delib-
erations and how or whether it reaches consensus. In a review of the lit-
erature on clinical case consultation, Williams-Jones found that 
when the consultant or chair is a physician, the ethics discussion tends 
to focus on clinical issues, supporting physicians, and returning the 
treatment and team to "normal" functioning. By contrast, when the 
consultant is a non-physician ethicist, the consult is more open, inter-
active, and open to non-clinical issues; patients and family members are 
also more likely to be involved in the discussion. 17 
The role of attorneys on HCECs has been controversial, in particular, the 
appropriateness of the participation of hospital legal counsel. Some writers 
have argued that their participation may be clouded by conflicts of interest. 
Others fear that concerns about law will dominate any discussion and chill 
analysis of the ethical issues involved. 18 In part, the controversy about the 
role of lawyers on ethics committees may result from confusion about the 
role of legal standards in HCEC deliberations and whether HCECs should 
be providing legal advice. A study of hospital ethics committees in three 
jurisdictions found that health care providers view providing legal advice 
on issues related to patient care as a primary role of ethics committees, and 
a majority of respondents in two of the jurisdictions indicated that their 
committee was influenced a great deal by the legal consequences of its 
recommendations. 19 
Institutional setting in which HCECs operate 
While the large majority of the literature on HCECs focuses on their role 
and operation in hospitals, HCECs have been adopted by other types of 
health care institutions including nursing homes, home health agencies, 
hospices, and managed care organizations (MCOs). A 1997 survey by the 
American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging (a membership 
organization of not-for-profit nursing homes) found that sixty-six percent 
of non-profit nursing homes had established an HCEC. 20 A more recent 
survey by the New York City Long-Term Care Ethics Network of one 
hundred and twenty-eight nursing homes indicated that the percentage of 
these facilities with an ethics committee increased from forty-one percent in 
1994 to seventy-one percent in 1999.21 National statistics on the percentage 
of hospices or home health agencies that have an ethics committee are not 
available. Christensen and Tucker, however, see these institutions as poised 
to confront ethical issues that have, until relatively recently, been the focus 
of hospital ethics committees. These authors describe several trends influ-
encing the growth of non-hospital HCECs, including declining numbers of 
hospital inpatients due to technological breakthroughs, incentives to 
contain costs, and increased acuity in the outpatient setting. Given these 
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trends, they point out the need to address ethical issues in non-hospital 
settings: "[e]specially as our entire population ages, more and more care 
is given in long-term care facilities and through [hospice and] home 
health agencies. The result is a growing need to find ethics structures that 
transcend organizational boundaries and provide better continuity of 
services. " 22 
A number of MCOs have also established ethics committees. While some 
MCOs, such as Kaiser Permanente and Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, have 
active committees and ethics programs, others devote little or no resources 
to HCECs. For example, in one study, none of the MCOs employing nurses 
to perform utilization review had an ethics committee to help nurse 
reviewers in the complex decisions they made regarding medical care utili-
zation.23 Guzman observed in the late 1990s that the focus of bioethics in 
managed care had shifted from case consultation to policy development 
and education and that ethics committees were influencing policy in "a 
small but growing number of MCOs." 24 
Functions of HCECs 
While HCECs vary in their mission and operation, most have three basic 
functions: education, policy development, and case consultation 25 In their 
educational role, HCECs provide information and resources to hospital 
staff about issues in ethical decision making. Such education is typically 
accomplished through conferences, seminars, grand rounds, educational 
materials, resource centers, and so on. Ethics committee networks have 
been established in a number of states to provide educational resources and 
programs to assist ethics committees in their educational mission. HCECs 
may also engage in policy formulation on ethical issues affecting patient 
care. Examples of policies crafted or revised by HCECs include those 
addressing Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) Orders, artificial nutrition and 
hydration, informed consent, surrogate decision making, guardianship, 
determination of competency, medically ineffective treatment, and advance 
directives. Case consultation involves the actual discussion of a case by an 
ethics committee in response to a request from a staff person, patient or 
their agent, guardian, or surrogate. Case consultation can take two forms: 
(I) retrospective review, in which those involved in a consult seek feedback 
on a difficult decision that was already made, or (2) concurrent or pro-
spective review, in which ethics committee members are actively involved in 
the case as a decision is being made. 
A fourth function carried out by some committees is "organizational 
ethics." This involves looking at ethical issues that arise more broadly 
within the institution on a system-wide basis. In some institutions, separate 
committees advise the institution on clinical ethics and organizational 
ethics; in others, one committee performs both functions. Some argue the 
two (clinical and organizational ethics) have different, albeit overlapping, 
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goals and functions and thus should be kept separate. 26 Others think that, 
because most ethical conflicts in a given health care institution have roots at 
the systems-level, a more efficient approach is to have one committee 
respond both to individual consult requests as well as to the organizational 
problems underlying them.17 Trinity Health, a Catholic health care organi-
zation, has developed what it refers to as a "next generation model of clin-
ical ethics." This model involves a shift from a primary focus on education, 
policy, and case consultation/review to "system change through quality 
management."28 
Types of cases that come to HCECs 
While there are no comprehensive empirical data on the types of cases or 
frequency with which cases come to ethics committees, accounts in the 
literature indicate various common characteristics of cases that are referred 
to HCECs. Most cases involve the termination or withholding of life-
sustaining treatment. In one study of randomly selected internal medicine 
physicians in the United States, a little over half had requested an ethics 
consult - most commonly for ethical dilemmas related to end-of-life deci-
sion making, patient autonomy issues, and conflicts over patient care.29 
Often, the cases involved patients who lacked decision making capacity. In 
some of these cases, there was a question about whether the patient was 
capable of making an informed decision, and health care providers wanted 
to know if they could rely on the patient's consent or needed to consult a 
surrogate. This is common when a patient declines a life-saving treatment 
recommended by the medical staff. In addition, there may be a dispute or 
question about whether a patient is chronically ill, terminally ill, and/or 
"imminently dying." While most reports in the literature discuss cases 
involving elderly adults, cases involving young adults, children, or infants 
may also come to the committee. In cases involving end-of-life care, types 
of treatments that may be at issue include ventilatory support, artificial 
nutrition and hydration, antibiotic therapy, CPR, kidney dialysis, surgery, 
and chemotherapy. Cases coming to the committees, however, are not lim-
ited to termination of life-sustaining treatment. Other issues that may arise 
include appropriateness of treatment, confidentiality, surrogate decision 
making, resource allocation, cost containment, and issues related to 
managed care.30 
While some cases coming to committees may simply require clarification 
of issues or facilitation of communication between parties, others involve 
disputes between patients, families, and providers. Such disputes may occur 
between an incapacitated patient's family members and the patient's treat-
ing physician, or between family members of such patients. Disputes may 
also arise between health care providers, for example, between physicians, 
or between nurses and physicians, but these cases seem to surface less 
frequently. 
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Common types of disputes 
Difference in belief over what the patient wanted or meant by certain 
statements 
Disputes over what an incompetent patient would have wanted may result 
from undocumented conversations, or different inferences drawn from the 
patient's statements or behavior. In the case of Mack v. Mack, 31 involving a 
dispute between the wife and father of a patient who had been in a persis-
tent vegetative state for several years, the parties each related stories that 
they believed conveyed the patient's desires regarding life support in his 
current state. After visiting his elderly grandmother who was unable to feed 
herself and required assistance, the patient had stated that if he ever got to 
the point where he "could not do for himself' he did not want to live. His 
wife concluded from this statement and others that he would not want to 
be kept alive via feeding tubes. 32 However, when the patient was a boy his 
mother died of a stroke. At the time of the stroke, the patient's father was 
told that there was a small chance that his mother could be kept alive with 
surgery but that in all likelihood she would be an "80% vegetable." The 
boy's father chose to have the surgery but his wife died before anything 
could be done. A few years later the boy thanked his father for considering 
the surgery. The father believed that this demonstrated his son's desire to 
be kept alive even with minimal quality of life. 33 
Interpretation of terms 
A patient's advance directive may include terms that are not well defined 
and may be interpreted differently. For example, a patient's living will may 
state that the patient does not want life-sustaining treatment if terminally ill 
with no hope of recovery. 34 What constitutes being "terminally ill" with 
"no hope of recovery" is open to interpretation. Physicians and family 
members may have differing opinions of a patient's medical prognosis and 
apply different definitions of "terminal illness." The law in most states does 
not clearly define terminal illness and leaves room for physician interpreta-
tion of the term. Some physicians may decide that someone is terminally ill 
if they have a life expectancy of six months or less; others may believe that 
someone is not terminally ill unless they can predict with a good deal of 
medical certainty that the patient will die within a few weeks. Physicians 
also have discretion in deciding what is meant by "no hope of recovery." 
Neither living will forms nor state statutes define the term. 35 
Differing perceptions of the benefits and burdens ol a proposed treatment 
and quality of lij"e 
Physicians and patients or their family members may disagree over the 
benefits and burdens of continued life support and quality of life issues. 
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Physicians may focus more on the probability of "success" of a certain 
procedure than on the patient's quality of life after the procedure. Family 
members, however, may see the burdens associated with life in a persistent 
vegetative state or with advanced Alzheimer's and not see the benefit of 
continued treatment. Alternatively, in some cases, family members may 
believe that life itself is sacred, no matter what its quality, whereas the 
physician may think that life in certain states is not worth sustaining. 36 
Physicians and family members, for example, disagreed over the care of 
Helga Wanglie, an eighty-eight-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative 
state. Her physicians wanted to discontinue life support, arguing that it was 
futile to continue such support under those circumstances, while her 
husband felt her life was worth continuing.37 
Lack of clarity as to who has decision making authority 
In some states, laws provide that a physician need not follow the 
instructions of a surrogate if to do so would be contrary to the physi-
cian's conscience or inconsistent with "generally accepted standards of 
patient care."38 Such provisions, which may allow physicians to usurp 
decision making authority from family members, can also lead to dis-
putes. The federal Baby Doe Rules, 39 in which decision making authority 
for the withholding or withdrawal of life support from newborns is given 
largely to physicians, have also led to disputes in cases where parents 
believe they should be allowed more input into these decisions. 4° Confu-
sion over who can speak for a patient can also originate from lack of an 
available surrogate decision-maker or disagreement over who should serve 
as the surrogate. In the well publicized case of Terri Schiavo, a Florida 
woman in a persistent vegetative state, family members fought bitterly 
over who should speak for Terri and whether her feeding should be 
continued. Michael, her husband, requested that her tube feedings be 
stopped. Her parents challenged Michael's stewardship as surrogate deci-
sion-maker, based on allegations that he had financial and personal con-
flicts of interest.41 
Disagreement over when treatment is futile 
Different views about futility and the role of spiritual beliefs in effecting a 
"cure" create disagreements when decisions have to be made about with-
holding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatments. In the case of a 16-
month-old with AIDS who was in constant, agonizing pain, the foster par-
ents thought life support was not futile because God, not man, should make 
the decision as to when life ends, whereas the health care providers involved 
viewed the treatments as futile based on the inability to achieve a medical 
goal.42 In the oft cited case of Baby K,43 the hospital sought a declaratory 
judgment that it had no duty to provide life-sustaining treatment for an 
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anencephalic infant over objections of the mother. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that under the federal Emergency Med-
ical Treatment and Labor Act (EMT ALA)44 the hospital had a duty to treat 
Baby K. The Court determined that resuscitating Baby K (who would pre-
sent in respiratory distress) and putting her back on a ventilator was not 
medically futile because her admitting diagnosis was respiratory failure, not 
anencephaly. However, according to a dissenting opinion in the case, there 
was no obligation to resuscitate Baby K under EMTALA because the rele-
vant condition was anencephaly, not respiratory failure. 45 
Cases arising in non-hospital settings 
While most of the literature has focused on cases that come to hospital 
ethics committees, issues that arise in non-hospital settings may be quite 
different from those arising in acute care settings. For example, in long-
term care facilities, committees may confront questions about the use of 
chemical or physical restraints, sexual relations between residents, and 
behavior management (issues that are referred to as matters of "everyday 
ethics").46 In home health care, ethical issues addressed by HCECs include 
maintaining agency solvency without denying care to patients who lack 
financial resources, practicing health care in situations where patients may 
be abused or neglected, inadequate care of a patient by the patient or 
family, termination of home care services (abandonment), and racial intol-
erance of patients, family members, and/or staff_47 In mental health and 
psychiatric treatment settings ethical issues most often involve maintaining 
patient confidentiality, boundary violations, and special concerns related to 
resource allocation.48 
Ethical concerns arising in MCOs often stem from their dual purposes of 
reducing unnecessary expenditures while maintaining quality. This often 
creates questions about the need for hospitalization or referrals to specia-
lists and policy issues about coverage of new procedures. Dombeck and 
Olsan describe several ethical concerns about managed care ranging from 
conflicts in the fiduciary relationship between physicians and their patients 
to "making limited health care resources available to some at the expense of 
others."49 
How are these cases handled by ethics committees? 
Because there are virtually no regulations governing ethics committees, their 
operations and procedures vary from committee to committee. As regards 
the process of ethics consultation, committees may adopt different struc-
tural and procedural models. In some institutions the full committee may 
conduct the consult; in others, it may fall on a small team or subcommittee 
or, in a growing number of institutions, on an individual consultant. The 
issue of which model is most appropriate or effective is still unresolved in 
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the field. Rubin and Zoloth, who advocate that the full committee engage in 
consultation, have lamented that "it is a significant problem that there has 
been no systematic empirical research or sustained philosophical debate to 
date about the relative effectiveness and desirability of the competing 
models of doing ethics consultation."50 
Perhaps more troubling is the lack of consensus regarding deliberative or 
procedural models for ethics committees addressing the cases that come to 
them. At least four procedural models are described in the literature: (1) the 
case conference model, in which the focus is on hearing from all parties and 
analyzing the advantages and disadvantges of various options without 
making a specific recommendation; (2) the consultation model, which takes 
its name from the traditional medical consultation model, in which the 
committee acts as a consultant or expert and is expected to recommend a 
specific course of action; (3) the quasi-judicial model in which the emphasis 
is placed on conflict resolution and due process; and (4) the mediation 
model in which the committee acts as a facilitator and assists the parties in 
reaching a consensus on the issue in dispute. In both the consultation and 
quasi-judicial models the committee makes a recommendation to the parties 
as to how to proceed. 51 
There remain significant differences among scholars and practitioners as 
to which of these four models is most appropriate and effective. While the 
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) has embraced a 
facilitation model, there are voices that reject the model as inconsistent with 
the normative role of bioethics. These latter advocates argue that 
[c]linical ethics cannot be agnostic when it comes to making a recom-
mendation. The cases that come for ethics consultation involve real 
patients and families and real health care professionals, and they 
involve situations in which a real decision will be made. Advice, not 
simply a facilitated exchange is what is being sought and what ought to 
be promised. 52 
When ethics committee members deliberate among themselves and alLC7>nt 
to arrive at a recommendation, relevant legal and ethical norms typically 
inform the committee's recommendation. Bioethicsts have espoused a 
number of theories to guide ethical case analysis, such as principle-based 
ethics, casuistry, consequentialism, deontology, feminist ethics, and narra-
tive ethics. Principle-based case analysis, based on applying and weighing 
the principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, 
and justice, was the first to gain widespread recognition. 53 However, 
some have criticized a principled approach as lacking in methodological 
application and biased toward concerns of individual autonomy. 54 This has 
led to a continuing conversation in bioethics about how ethical principles 
and theory should inform deliberation of cases brought before ethics 
committees. 55 
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When considering the cultural diversity within the United States and 
abroad, some argue that moral issues, which are contextually (e.g., cultu-
rally) based, cannot be "resolved" by bioethicists applying cross-cultural 
moral norms or theories. 56 Yet, universal moral theory is not necessarily 
incompatible with contextually based case analysis. For example, in the 
more communitarian cultures, the practices of truth-telling and informed 
consent are approached differently than in the United States. This, how-
ever, does not preclude applying a principles-based approach - rather, the 
principles will be weighed differently in the context of a communitarian 
culture, where respecting autonomy might involve allowing an individual to 
defer decision making to the group, and balancing benefits and harms 
might entail prioritizing group harmony rather than individual rights. 57 
Likewise, use of narrative ethics58 in case consultation does not preclude 
application of other ethical theories. Indeed, Macklin argues that many 
norms are relative to the moralities of individual cultures, while recognizing 
that basic human rights exist that must be protected across cultures.59 
Beauchamp, claiming that no prevailing ethical theory has been shown to 
serve any useful purpose in bioethics, calls upon bioethicists to shift the 
focus toward universal norms (e.g., principles, rights, virtues) that can be 
applied across practice settings. 60 
While ethical norms play a role in HCEC deliberations, these are also 
influenced by the characteristics of the U.S. health care system, including 
growing numbers of uninsured and under-insured persons, technology that 
shifts the site of treatment from hospitals to outpatient settings, and pres-
sures to cut costs, including an increasing penetration of MCOs.61 Profit 
status and religious affiliation may also influence ethics committees' pro-
cesses and deliberations. Few have studied the influence of an HCEC's 
profit-status, per se, on ethics committee functioning, although much has 
been written about the ethical conflicts of interest that may be created by 
profit seeking. Dugan describes several ways in which religiously based 
health care organizations (HCOs) differ from non-religious HCOs in their 
approach to ethical issues. The former, he observes, use a wider "radar 
screen" by which to capture ethical dilemmas or conflicts in the net of issues 
for ethical deliberation (e.g., contraceptive sterilization in Catholic hospi-
tals, which must abide by the norms of the U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops' Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Ser-
vices); spend greater time researching and reflecting on how interventions 
that may be grounded in laws and ethical principles are also consistent with 
the organization's religious mission and core values; and take a different 
approach to the integration of the organization's mission into clinical deci-
sion making (i.e., equipping staff with "the skills and tools to integrate 
religiously based core values into all aspects of their responsibilities").62 
Heller believes that whether or not an HCO's religious affiliation makes a 
difference in the nature of the ethical issues it confronts or in the way its 
ethics committee and consultants work is case specific.63 
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Legal evolution of ethics committees 
As stated above, ethics committees have remained largely unregulated in 
the United States, yet court opinions and statutes in some states have 
encouraged their establishment, protected their members from liability, 
mandated basic requirements for membership and due process, and/or 
given them legal authority for health care decision making. While the 
majority of courts seem to have embraced the notion of ethics committees, 
not all have agreed with the wisdom of allowing them to substitute for 
judicial decision making. Shortly after the Quinlan case, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, in the case of Joseph Saikewicz, a sixty-seven-year-
old, never competent, terminally ill cancer patient, challenged the assump-
tions of the Quinlan court regarding the merits of HCECs. The court stated 
that questions of life and death 
require the process of detached but passionate investigation and deci-
sion that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government 
was created. Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and that of the 
lower courts, and is not to be entrusted to any other group purporting 
to represent the "morality and conscience of our society," no matter 
how highly motivated or impressively constituted.64 
Other courts also expressed skepticism about granting decision making 
authority to HCECs, especially in the early stages of their development. 
One court described them as "ill-defined, amorphous bod[ies], which in 
some hospitals may not even exist."65 
However, there has been an equally vocal, if not louder, call by a number 
of courts for the establishment in health care institutions of bodies, such as 
ethics committees, to deal with the difficult end-of-life care cases that come 
to them. For example, in In re Jobes, 66 in which the husband of a non-
elderly woman who was comatose and in a nursing horne brought suit 
seeking termination of her life-sustaining nutrition and hydration, the N.J. 
Supreme Court stated that 
courts are not the proper place to resolve the agonizing personal pro-
blems that underlie these cases. Our legal system cannot replace the 
more intimate struggle that must be borne by the patient, those caring 
for the patient, and those who are about the patient. The challenge for 
the courts will be to evolve innovative and flexible processes by which 
affected individuals can participate comfortably and confidently to 
secure the vindication of the interests we all seek to protect. 67 
In a concurring opinion in that case, Justice Pollack more specifically men-
tioned the need for ethics committees stating that "[a]s an aid to physicians 
and families, hospitals and other health care facilities, such as nursing 
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homes, should give serious consideration to making available the services of 
ethicists and institutional ethics committees."68 
ln 1990, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was called 
upon to determine "who has the right to decide the course of medical 
treatment for a patient who, although near death, is pregnant with a viable 
fetus" and "how that decision should be made if the patient cannot make it 
for herself."69 The judge, speaking for the court, stated in a footnote 
We observe ... that it would be far better if judges were not called to 
patients' bedsides and required to make quick decisions on issues of life 
and death. Because judgment in such a case involves complex medical 
and ethical issues as well as the application of legal principles, we 
would urge the establishment - through legislation or otherwise - of 
another tribunal to make these decisions, with limited opportunity for 
judicial review. 70 
More recently, in Quill v. Vacca, Judge Milner, writing for the Second Cir-
cuit, "suggested that a state might 'require the establishment of local ethics 
committees as resources for physicians' in order to deal with such difficult 
questions as physician assisted suicide." 71 
State legislatures have also encouraged the establishment of HCECs but 
have done little to assure their quality. The Maryland law, enacted in 1987, 
is unique in providing requirements for committee membership and due 
process. The law, in addition to requiring all hospitals and nursing homes 
in the state to establish such committees, requires that the committees must 
have at least four members, including a physician, a nurse, a social worker, 
and a hospital's chief executive officer or designee. 72 Other members may 
be added as the hospital chooses, including representatives of the commu-
nity and ethical advisors or clergy_73 Each committee must set forth in 
writing how it shall be convened. lt must make a good-faith effort to notify 
patients and their immediate family members of their rights to petition the 
committee for assistance. Each committee must also meet with these 
patients and their immediate family members concerning "options for 
medical treatment"; it must also provide the patient and immediate family 
members with an explanation of the "basis of the advisory committee's 
advice." 74 As part o_f its deliberations the committee must consult all 
members of the patient's treatment team, the patient, and the patient's 
family. The Act further provides that the proceedings of the committee are 
confidential and that the advice of the committee must become part of the 
patient's medical record. 75 
A few states have provided protection from liability for ethics committee 
members. The Maryland statute provides that committee members who give 
advice in good faith may not be held liable in court for the advice givenJ6 
ln other states, including Arizona, Hawaii, and Montana, statutes grant 
immunity from civil or criminal liability "to members of ethics committees 
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or healthcare providers who rely on committee advice."77 As a result, as one 
author has noted, disputes considered by these committees "are increasingly 
unlikely to be reviewed substantively by a court. "78 In a number of other 
states, existing statutes that protect peer review committees and medical 
staff committee proceedings may also protect members of ethics committees 
by preventing discovery of their meeting minutes and deliberations.79 
More recently, states have passed statutes allowing ethics committees to 
serve as '·surrogate" decision-makers in cases where there is a dispute between 
family members or where no family members are available. In Maryland, if 
there is a dispute between surrogate decision-makers of equal standing 
regarding termination of life support for a patient lacking decision making 
capacity, the institutional ethics committee may make the decision. The 
patient's physician may then act in accordance with the committee's recom-
mendation without fear of liability for any claim based on lack of consent. so 
In addition, the statute requires that where physicians believe a decision by 
surrogates or agents is "inconsistent with generally accepted standards of 
patient care," they bring the case to the ethics committee or to court.s 1 
Similarly, in Texas, ethics committees may serve as a dispute resolution body. 
When patients and physicians disagree about life-sustaining treatment, an 
ethics committee's decision is final unless the patient is transferred. 82 
In several other states ethics committees are given decision making 
authority when there is no legally authorized surrogate or when one is not 
available to speak with the patient. For example, the Arizona law regarding 
surrogate decision making states that if a health care provider cannot locate 
any of the surrogates designated by the statute in a case involving a patient 
who lacks decision making capacity, the "patient's attending physician may 
make health care treatment decisions for the patient after the physician 
consults with and obtains the recommendations of an institutional ethics 
committee." 83 The statute, however, further provides that "[i]f this is not 
possible, the physician may make these decisions after consulting with a 
second physician who concurs with the physician's decision."84 The statute 
defines an "institutional ethics committee" as a "standing committee of a 
licensed health care institution appointed or elected to render advice 
concerning ethical issues involving medical treatment."85 
In Alabama, the statute regarding termination of life support provides 
that if a patient 
has no relatives known to the attending physician or to an adminis-
trator of the facility where the patient is being treated and none can be 
found after a reasonable inquiry, a committee composed of the 
patient's primary treating physician and the ethics committee of the 
facility where the patient is undergoing treatment or receiving care86 
is authorized to make decisions "regarding the withholding of life-sustaining 
treatment or artificially provided nutrition and hydration."87 If there is no 
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ethics committee, a committee consisting of certain specified members and 
appointed by the chief medical staff or chief executive officer of the facility 
is authorized to make these decisions. 88 In either of these circumstances, the 
health care facility involved must notify the Alabama Department of 
Human Resources to allow the department "to participate in the review of 
the matter pursuant to its responsibilities under the Adult Protective 
Services Act. "89 
In Florida, if a patient lacks an advance directive and is unable to make 
health care decisions for him or herself and the patient does not have a 
guardian or a family member or close friend who is authorized to make 
health care decisions for the patient, the bioethics committee of the facility 
in which the patient is located may select a clinical social worker who is 
either licensed or a graduate of a court-approved guardianship program to 
act as a surrogate for the patient. 90 If the social worker asks to withdraw or 
withhold life support, that decision must be reviewed by the facility's 
bioethics committee.91 
In a few states, ethics committees are given the authority to review deci-
sions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment when the patient is 
in a specific condition or when a specific type of intervention is going to be 
withheld. For example, Florida law provides that for patients in a persistent 
vegetative state, if the patient does not have an advance directive and there 
is no evidence of whether the patient would have wanted medical treatment 
in this state, life-sustaining treatment may only be withheld or withdrawn if 
a court-appointed guardian, in consultation with a medical ethics commit-
tee, concludes "that the condition is permanent and that there is no rea-
sonable medical probability for recovery and that withholding or 
withdrawing life-prolonging procedures is in the best interest of the 
patient. "92 In Georgia, if there is no legally authorized surrogate, an ethics 
committee, at the request of a physician with a concurring second opinion, 
may approve a DNR order for a patient. 93 
In one state, a health care provider may be disciplined for failing to 
cooperate with an ethics committee. The North Carolina Medicine and 
Allied Occupations Article provides as grounds for the denial, suspension, 
or revocation of a license of a psychologist where the psychologist has 
failed to cooperate with or respond "promptly, completely, and honestly" 
to a hospital ethics committee. 94 
Self-regulation 
While these statutes have given ethics committees significant authority, they 
have imposed little or no requirements on committee composition, compe-
tency, or process. Although academic and certification programs in bioeth-
ics exist, there is currently no licensing of ethics consultants. Instead, 
ethicists rely on self-regulation by way of professional societies (such as the 
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) and the Canadian 
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Bioethics Society), or on the norms governing other professions to which 
they belong, such as nursing, medicine, or social work. The Canadian 
Bioethics Society convened an ad hoc working group on Employment 
Standards for Bioethics, which has been worked into a draft Model Code 
of Ethics for Bioethics.95 However, the question of professional obligations 
of bioethics consultants and their scope of practice remains unresolved. 
In 1998, the ASBH published its Core Competencies For Health Care 
Ethics Consultation.96 The publication delineates which skills and sources of 
knowledge ethics committee members should possess, acknowledging that 
some members will have more ethical expertise than others, but that all 
should possess "minimum competencies." These are currently the only 
"industry wide" standards for ethics committees that have received some 
consensus in the United States. 
Cases where ethics committees have been sued 
In jurisdictions where ethics committees have not been granted immunity 
from liability as institutional committees giving advice to parties about 
patient treatment issues, they may be subject to lawsuit. While legal action 
against committees has been rare, it has occurred, most often in cases 
involving a dispute over whether continuing treatment is futile. Perhaps the 
earliest suit against an ethics committee was that brought by Elizabeth 
Bouvia in the mid 1980s.97 The case involved a dispute between a compe-
tent patient and her physician, the hospital, and members of the hospital 
ethics committee who agreed with the physician's decision to feed the 
patient against her wishes through a nasogastric tube. By reasoning that the 
decision was not a medical one nor a "conditional right subject to approval 
by an ethics committee," a California Appeals court held that the feeding 
tube should be removed. Subsequently, Bouvia sued the hospital and the 
physicians for damages, and went so far as to name the ethics committee 
members in the complaint. Bouvia, however, decided not to pursue the suit 
against the committee members and subsequently dropped the suit against 
the hospital and physicians to avoid publicity.98 
Fletcher has described several other cases brought by patients or their 
family members against the chair or members of an HCEC after the com-
mittee or a committee member determined that life-sustaining treatment 
would be medically futile and the patient's physician withheld or withdrew 
such treatment without consulting the patient's family. 99 In Gilgunn v. 
Massachusetts General Hospital, 100 a patient's daughter sued the hospital 
and the chair of the ethics committee (called the Optimum Care Committee 
(OCC)) for violations of the daughter's rights as a surrogate. The chairman 
of the hospital's OCC endorsed a DNR order without consulting the 
daughter, despite her previous objection. The physician weaned the patient 
from the respirator and the patient died. At trial, the jury sided with 
the hospital and physicians. 101 The case was appealed but subsequently 
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dismissed, presumably as a result of settlement. In Estate of Bland v. Cigna 
Healthplan of Texas et al. 102 the patient's family brought suit for inten-
tional infliction of emotional harm due to a decision made by the chair of 
the ethics committee to remove the patient from a respirator without con-
sulting the family or the patient's original physician. The suit was settled 
out of court. 103 
Similar cases were filed in Pennsylvania and Virginia. In Rideout v. Her-
shey Medical Center, 104 the parents of a tw~-year-old comatose patient who 
suffered from a brainstem tumor sued the hospital because the child had 
been removed from a ventilator against the parents' wishes. The hospital 
ethics committee agreed with the physician that a DNR order was appro-
priate and supported the decision to remove the child from the ventilator. 
A three-judge panel ruled that the parents could continue with their claims 
that the hospital committed assault and battery on the child, negligently 
and intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the parents, and impinged 
parental rights rooted in the free exercise of religion. However, the case was 
subsequently settled. 105 The 1996 Virginia case of Bryan v. Stone. et a!.: 
Bryan v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, et a!., involved the 
family of a patient suffering from multiple disabling medical conditions. 
The family requested all possible treatment, including resuscitative efforts. 
Despite the protests of the patient's husband, the attending physician 
requested assistance from the ethics committee. After an ad hoc advisory 
committee convened by the ethics committee chair declared CPR to be 
futile, the physician wrote a DNR order and informed the patient's hus-
band. The patient died eight days later. In their first law suit, the family 
sued the attending physician and members of the ad hoc group for viola-
tion of the patient's religious beliefs and some provisions of the Virginia 
Healthcare Decisions Act (VHDA). 106 The VHDA stipulates that physi-
cians are not required to prescribe or render treatment that the physician 
determines to be "medically or ethically inappropriate," and that in such 
circumstances a good faith effort be made to transfer the patient to the care 
of another physician. 107 The suit was eventually dismissed. 
More recently, suits against ethics consultants have been reported in the 
press. In response, the ASBH established a committee to make a recom-
mendation on whether ethics consultants and members of ethics commit-
tees, not already covered under their institution's malpractice insurance 
policy, should obtain their own malpractice insurance coverage.lD8 
How have courts weighed recommendations by ethics committees in 
cases that have come to them? 
A few courts have also been called upon to address disputes that were pre-
viously heard by an ethics committee. While these cases have also been 
relatively infrequent, in the cases that have been reviewed by the courts, the 
courts have been inconsistent in how they have regarded them. In a few 
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cases, they have ignored ethics committee recommendations. In others, they 
have treated the ethics committee recommendation as confirmation of a 
physician's determination. In at least one case, In re Torres, 109 the court 
noted that the record included the reports of three biomedical ethics com-
mittees that reviewed Torres' case, and appeared to regard the committees 
as authorities on moral issues. 110 
Courts may wish to give different weight to committee recommendations 
as ethics committees vary significantly in composition, experience, expertise, 
and procedures. Given the disparity among committees, in reviewing an 
ethics committee recommendation arguably courts should consider: (1) 
whether the ethics committee members have had any training in bioethics 
or law; (2) whether the committee includes community representatives or 
other individuals who can provide values that may differ from those of 
health care providers or other staff, for example, patients or family mem-
bers of patients; and (3) whether the committee followed minimal elements 
of due process, including providing (i) notice and an opportunity for the 
relevant parties to be heard, (ii) evidence of diverse committee participation 
in the deliberative process, and (iii) a rationale for its final recommendation 
backed by relevant ethical and societal norms. 
Conclusion 
The role and legal status of ethics committees in the United States remains 
amorphous. Committees, for the most part, remain unregulated and dis-
agreements exist in the field as to whether regulation is appropriate. Despite 
the lack of homogeneity in committee function and operation and the 
inconsistent quality in committee performance, a number of state legis-
latures have given HCECs legal authority to make health care decisions for 
patients lacking health care decision making capacity and/or available sur-
rogates. While threats of malpractice may lead to improvements in ethics 
committee performance, in a number of jurisdictions ethics committees 
have been protected by statute from liability. In addition, suits have been 
rare and there are no published judicial opinions that have articulated 
standards for ethics committee process. As a result, committees continue to 
operate with minimum oversight and without legal standards. 
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